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Perhaps the most frightening apparition of our times is the 
possibility that a biological agent (bacterium, virus, or toxin) will 
be used to attack our unprotected civilian population and inflict 
mass casualties. 
Barbara F. Bullock 
The Counterproliferation Papers, 
Future Warfare Series  
USAF Counterproliferation Center 
February 2002 
 
A biopower in excess of sovereign right…appears when it 
becomes technologically and politically possible for man not only 
to manage life but to make it proliferate, to create living matter, to 
build the monster, and, ultimately, to build viruses that can not be 
controlled and that are universally destructive. This formidable 
extension of biopower…will put it beyond all human sovereignty. 
Michel Foucault 
“Society Must Be Defended” 
Lectures at the Collége de France, 1975-76 
17 March 1976 
 
 
Over the last ten years, an emergent public health technology known as 
syndromic surveillance was requisitioned as an early warning system for 
bioterrorist attacks on the United States. Specifically, this technology attracted 
interest and funds earmarked for bioterrorism defense because of a potential 
ability to rapidly detect unexpected epidemics of disease. The transformation 
was profound: a small-scale experiment undertaken by New York City public 
health officials in 1995 has now been implemented in state and federal health 
departments across the country. Commentators have not hesitated to describe 
bioterrorism defense as an epochal shift in the institutional formations of the 
state, heralding a nascent integration of national security and public health. In 
2002, President Bush called one syndromic system a “modern DEW line,” 
referring to the radar shield built over the arctic circle to detect Soviet bombers 
in the 1950s.1 Syndromic surveillance articulates somewhat awkwardly with 
this apparent integration, however: the technology was not designed with 
                                                           
1 Quoted in “NRDM: National Retail Data Monitor: a public health surveillance tool” [online]. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, Real-time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance (RODS) Laboratory. 
Accessed from: <http://www.health.pitt.edu/rods> 
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bioweapons in mind, and questions remain about its utility for national defense 
against weaponized microbes.2 Rather than an example of incipient integration, 
I argue that syndromic surveillance re-situates the terms of security and health. 
The technical innovations developed in syndromic surveillance open up a novel 
pathological domain, that is, a new social geography in which disease is 
thinkable and visible. By organizing and breaking up the world in new ways, this 
technical rationality displaces and re-inscribes the populations and territories 
that underpin the practices of war and health. 
 
Since at least the seventeenth century, surveillance has been an important 
political technology in the governmental battle with epidemic disease. Put 
generally, disease surveillance informs about and intervenes in epidemics in 
order to end them or reduce their harmfulness. Yet the specific mechanisms 
used to monitor disease have changed, as have their pathological domains. The 
development of syndromic surveillance during the 1990s was deeply shaped by 
critiques of then standard surveillance practices. A study commissioned by the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in 2000 on infectious diseases located two 
serious weaknesses in standard public health surveillance. The first was its 
dependence on clinical and laboratory diagnostic reports as sources of health 
data: 
 
Provider and laboratory reporting of infectious diseases is 
incomplete and untimely. Case reporting is a critical foundation 
for infectious disease surveillance; full participation from the 
provider community is a necessary component of a functional 
surveillance system under current data flow arrangements. 
Estimates of completeness of reporting range from 6% to 90% 
for many of the commonly notifiable diseases.3  
 
The second weakness was a practice known as categorical reporting. Since the 
beginning of disease reporting in the nineteenth century, health departments 
have only mandated reports for those diseases listed as notifiable. The 
decentralized structure of disease surveillance (and public health generally) in 
the United States, responsibilities shared among “health care providers; more 
than 3,000 local health departments…59 state and territorial health 
departments…public and private laboratories; and…four federal 
departments,”4 creates multiple and contradictory lists of notifiable diseases. In 
result, according to the CDC study, “the surveillance infrastructure is 
                                                           
2
 Arthur Rheingold, “If Syndromic Surveillance Is the Answer, Then What Is the Question?” Biosecurity 
and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science vol. 1, no. 2 (2003): 77-81. 
3 Raymond Baxter et. al., “Assessing Core Capacity for Infectious Diseases Surveillance: Final Report” 
The Lewin Group (1 November 2000): 17. 
4 GAO, “Emerging infectious diseases: review of state and federal disease surveillance efforts,” 
September 2004. 
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fragmented and focused on specific disease rather than on the broad range of 
threats that face a given population.”5 
 
Syndromic surveillance, in contrast, monitors “non-specific health indicator 
data”: anything that provides information about health without the specificity of 
a clinical or laboratory diagnosis. From pharmaceutical sales to emergency 
room triage records to worker absenteeism, syndromic surveillance exploits 
unconventional data sources in order to bypass diagnostic interpretations. This 
non-specific health information is then translated into syndromes, that is, 
standardized collections of health symptoms.6 Rather than calculating the 
number of patients diagnosed with a specific disease (like smallpox), syndromic 
surveillance calculates the number of syndrome cases (like diarrhea) present in 
an observed population.  
 
The subject of the clinical gaze and the species of the laboratory gaze are 
dissolved into this new pathological domain. In their place, syndromic 
surveillance organizes novel populations out of pharmaceutical markets and ER 
databases. These populations are distinct from the sort of population that one 
belongs to in the sense of a national population. These are not societies made 
up of individuals, but populations in the abstract, statistical sense, formed out 
of markets and databases.7  
 
Today, syndromic surveillance constitutes these new statistical populations for 
a single purpose: in order to detect the unusual epidemics associated with 
bioweapons. As New York City health department statistician Kevin Konty puts 
it, the syndromic system is still being “tuned” for better bioweapons detection.8 
Rather than looking for a known object, the New York City syndromic system is 
being built to recognize the improbable when it occurs– a flu epidemic out of 
season, for example. In what I call the expectation of the exceptional, 
syndromic surveillance has been designed specifically to quickly recognize the 
epidemic that is out of the ordinary, the epidemic unconstrained by known 
etiology.9  
 
At stake is a new regime of uncertainty that cuts to the core of contemporary 
concerns with security. For if syndromic surveillance attempts to recognize the 
                                                           
5 Baxter, et al, “Assessing Core Capacity,” 18. 
6 For example, in one coding system the syndrome diarrheah translates the symptoms diarrhea, 
enteritis, gastroenteritis, and stomach virus 
7 cf. Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on Control Socieites” in Deleuze, Negotiations (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995); Francois Ewald, “Insurance and Risk” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and 
Peter Miller, eds, The Foucault Effect (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). Ewald refers to 
the collectivities formed by insurance statistics as “abstract mutualities” distinct from the “qualitative 
mutualities” of the family, the corporation, the union, and the commune. 
8 Interview with Kevin Konty, Statistician, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 
Infectious Disease Monitoring Branch. March 4, 2005. 
9 Etiology refers to the natural history or origins of diseases. 
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unknown, it is only because dreams of perfect knowledge, visions in which 
epidemic disease could be known and eradicated, no longer seem possible. 
According to this logic, disease surveillance can no longer hope to ensure or 
produce order, but instead can only “shorten the time from absolute chaos to 
controlled disorder.”10 Syndromic surveillance has been assigned, within the 
interstices of public health and national security, to control (not prevent or 
defend against) the disorders of deliberate epidemics.  
 
 
Bioweapons 
 
The bioterrorism threat lies beyond the range of both national security and 
public health practices as they are presently defined. A RAND white paper11 
articulates this complexity: 
 
The scope of bioterrorism is vast. It brings together three 
distinctive elements (terrorist, biological agent, and living target) 
that are the responsibility of diverse professional communities, 
with very different areas of expertise. These communities normally 
operate independently of one another. During a bioterrorism event 
these professional communities must find ways to cooperate in 
mutually beneficial ways, or risk jeopardizing their objectives.12 
 
Defense against the bioterrorism threat, the RAND paper suggests, requires 
action on three fronts: terrorist, biological agent, living target. While the terrorist 
remains the responsibility of the national security system, the biological agent 
and the living target operate outside of the typical national security domain. 
Locating the enemy becomes highly complex: is it the terrorist, or the biological 
agent? While the terrorist releases the microbes in the first place, these 
microbes (particularly if contagious) can continue to wage war long after the 
terrorist has abandoned the battlefield.  
 
An anthropological description of this site cannot interpret only the actions or 
beliefs of human participants, but must account for the agency of microbes. As 
                                                           
10 Robin J. Strongin and C. Stephen Redhead, “Bioterrorism: Public Health Preparedness,” in Arthur 
P. Rogers, ed. Bioterrorism Reader (New York: Nova Sciences Publishers, 1993): 84-85. Dr. Roper is 
Dean of the School of Public Health at the University of North Carolina and was director of the CDC 
from 1990-93. Dr. Benjamin is Maryland’s Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene. 
11 A white paper is an offshoot of the term white book, referring to an official publication of the 
national government. From an online description, “A white paper typically argues a specific position or 
solution to a problem. Although white papers take their roots in governmental policy, they have 
become a common tool used to introduce technology innovations and products.” Available at: 
http://www.stelzner.com/copy-g-HowTo-whitepapers.php 
12 Helga Rippen, “A framework for the Information Infrastructure for Bioterrorism: Results of the 1st 
Summit” [online] RAND (December 2001): 3. Available at: <www.rand.org/scitech/stpi/ 
Infrastructure/Summit1/summary1.pdf> 
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Bruno Latour argues, the modern division of nature from culture turns a blind 
eye to the proliferating networks of humans and nonhumans.13 Social analysis 
typically restricts itself to the beliefs, actions, and power-effects of human 
beings. However, networks of relations between humans and nonhumans 
(animals, plants, things) condition and shape human power.14  
 
The so-called bioweapon is a particularly powerful hybrid of nature and culture. 
I use the term bioweapon to refer specifically to the deliberate use of a microbe, 
virus, or biological toxin as a weapon of war. A bioweapon is in a hybrid class 
of its own, separated from all other weapons and all other microbes, neither 
pure nature nor pure non-nature (as in culture, technology, human artifact).15  
 
The modern history of biological weapons begins during the 1930s during the 
buildup for World War II. Suspicious that Germany and Japan had biological 
programs, the United States initiated bioweapons research in 1942. George 
Merck, president of the pharmaceutical firm Merck & Co., oversaw research 
into weaponized pathogens under the War Research Service. While civilian 
researchers focused on biological defense, the Army Chemical Corps. built a 
major laboratory at Camp Detrick, Maryland for offensive research into anthrax, 
plague, typhus, yellow fever, and other agents. Research tailed off at war’s end 
but picked up again when war began in Korea. By the 1960s, at least seven 
effective bioweapons had been produced and tested. In 1972, however, 
mounting criticism led to President Nixon’s renunciation of offensive research 
and the destruction of all stocks.16 Ostensibly defensive research on 
bioweapons continues to this day in the United States, including at formerly 
offensive sites such as Camp Detrick.17  
 
Unlike natural microbes, the bioweapon has been conscripted in the circuits of 
war and politics. The release of a biological agent is therefore unconditioned by 
its endemic geography, seasonal tendencies, or natural pathogenicity. Take for 
example the anthrax letters mailed to senators and news desks in October 
2001. Anthrax is extremely rare in the United States: the network of scientific 
labs, angry mailer, and the postal system that assembled that October 
significantly expanded its territorial range. In material terms, bioweapons are 
often technologically manipulated. One of the side effects of advances in 
                                                           
13 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1993). 
14 Take for example Tim Mitchell’s analysis of the Aswan dam, the Nile, and the malarial mosquito and 
their assemblage in Egyptian national politics. Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, 
Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 
15 Of course, the separation of nature from culture is artificial to begin with. See Latour, We Have 
Never Been Modern. 
16 Eric Croddy, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen 
(New York: Copernicus Books, 2002): 226-232. 
17 See The Sunshine Project website for updated information about contemporary research into 
biological weapons for defensive purposes. Available at: http://www.sunshine-project.org/  
 
 
Fearnley / From Chaos to Controlled Disorder 
 6 
biotechnology over the past two decades is that it is now considered possible 
to genetically engineer bioweapons for increased pathogenicity or vaccine 
resistance.18 Even the basic anthrax used in 2001, however, was turned into a 
fine dust of dry spores in a lab. The resulting bioweapon is certainly not pure 
nature, but rather a hybrid of human intent and biological material. 
 
As a class of weapon the biological agent is also wholly distinct. Unlike the 
violent and immediate impact of other weapons, the biological agent’s attack is 
invisible and intangible. The victims of a bioweapon incorporate their microbial 
enemy within themselves in an innocent breath, unaware of their position on a 
battlefield.  
 
The result of this hybridity is an incredible amount of uncertainty. Ultimately, no 
one knows exactly what a terrorist attack with a biological agent would look 
like. As the RAND paper noted, the bioterrorism threat cannot be sufficiently 
dealt with by the modern institutions of health or defense. It is no longer 
sufficient to say that the military should deal with enemies and public health 
with microbes. For the microbe has become the enemy in the bioweapon.  
 
 
Three Genealogies of the Contemporary: 
National Security, National Health, and the Epidemic Nation 
 
Syndromic surveillance emerged in the interstices and conjunctions of two 
powerful techno-political apparatuses of the post-WWII state: national security 
and national health. The bioweapon as a threat to security is widely considered 
to challenge the separation of these domains. As former Secretary of Health 
Donna Shalala announced, this contemporary moment is ““the first time in 
American history in which the public health system has been directly integrated 
into the national security system.”19 This section intervenes in these self-
conscious assertions of integration. A genealogy of the contemporary 
assemblage of public health and national security demonstrates that these 
techno-political apparatuses are historically contextualized and contingent. 
Michel Foucault situates the formulation of these domains of knowledge and 
intervention within the wider transformation of sovereign power from classical 
absolutism to a rationalized governmentality. Rather than a set of ends or 
institutions,20 Foucault examines modern warfare and welfare in terms of 
                                                           
18 Laurie Garrett, Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health (New York: Hyperion, 2000): 
521-523. 
19 Quoted in Hillel W. Cohen, et al, “Bioterrorism initiatives: public health in reverse?” [online] Am J 
Public Health. Available at: <http://www.apha.org/journal/editorials/editcoh.htm> 
20 For those in national security institutions, national security is understood to refer to an end or ends: 
physical security (of territory and people), promotion of values, and economic prosperity, for example. 
cf. David Jablonsky, “The State of the National Security State,” Parameters, Winter 2002-3: 4-5. 
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technologies of power, that is, the mechanisms and rationalities they adopt to 
further their ends.21 
 
As Foucault hinted, the interface and entwinement of warfare and welfare 
technologies forms a fundamental locus of modern governmental 
intervention.22 Rather than distinct in means and ends, the two often operate in 
conjunction to increase the forces of the state. This conjuncture has taken a 
number of historical forms, including the application of psychiatry to war 
trauma, the identification of widespread chronic disease following universal 
male conscription, and the development of topical medicine in the context of 
colonial ambitions.23 In short, while the nexus between warfare and welfare 
technologies remains fundamental to modern governmental power, the 
technological form through which this nexus is exploited has changed over 
time. 
 
In this section, I adopt Foucault’s intellectual maxim (as formulated by Colin 
Gordon) that “political theory attends too much to institutions, and too little to 
practices.”24 I situate the genealogies of national security and national health 
institutions in the United States in terms of the rationalities, strategies, and 
technologies that underpin them. Both institutions assembled techno-strategies 
into coherent apparatuses towards the end of the Second World War. Both 
have been called into question by the apparent uncertainty of our 
contemporary.  
 
National Security 
 
The concept of ‘national security’ first became a fundamental pillar of US 
governmentality towards the end of the Second World War. As cuts in military 
spending loomed at war’s end, military planners (along with some civilian 
supporters) proposed a new understanding of military forces. Rather than rely 
upon rapid mobilizations following the outbreak of war, these planners argued 
that it was necessary to permanently prepare for unannounced attacks: what 
Michael Sherry calls an “ideology of preparedness.”25 They argued that the 
technological developments of the atomic bomb and the long-range bomber 
rendered obsolete the traditional reliance on oceans for a defense in 
geographic isolation. Instead, these planners believed that a new era of ‘total 
war’ had begun in which “the battle was not confined to the front lines but 
                                                           
21 Michel Foucault, “Security, Territory, Population,” in Paul Rabinow, ed., Ethics: Subjectivity and 
Truth (New York: The New Press, 1991): 69. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Roger Cooter, Mark Harrison, and Steve Sturdy, eds., Medicine and Modern Warfare (Atlanta, GA: 
Rodopi, 1999); John Farley, Bilharzia: A History of Tropical Medicine (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991);  
24 Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction” in Burchell, et. al., Foucault Effect, 4. 
25 Michael Sherry, Preparing For the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1977): 235 
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extended to the home front as well.”26 Rather than demobilization and 
dismantlement, they argued that a permanent “war machine” was required to 
enact a policy of active, rather than passive, defense.27  
 
The ideology achieved institutional cohesion with the National Security Act of 
1947. The act drastically reorganized the government, establishing the National 
Security Council as the preeminent advisor to the President on international 
affairs, transforming wartime intelligence agencies into the permanent Central 
Intelligence Agency, and uniting the multiple branches of the military into the 
single Department of Defense. Heavily oriented in budget and agenda towards 
military and diplomatic concerns throughout the Cold War, the United States 
became what has been called the national security state.28  
 
During what came to be called the Cold War, the national security state 
increasingly focused on a single enemy: the Soviet Union. As Colin Gray points 
out, “the capabilities, declarations, and actions that comprised US national 
security policy made sense only with reference to the Soviet threat.” 29 
Although the focus was single, the practice was schizophrenic. On the one 
hand, a stable, “cold” insecurity developed as diplomatic and military relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union achieved balance in the aptly 
named nuclear strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD). On the other 
hand, the United States entered into innumerable wars and skirmishes, most 
notable and destructive those of Korea and Vietnam.  
 
Despite the obvious inconsistencies and insecurities of the postwar national 
security state, many commentators now see the period in terms of relative 
stability.30 With the final collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the national 
security paradigm that perpetually invoked the Communist enemy collapsed as 
well. Critics from both within and without the military argued that the Cold War 
behemoth was anachronistic. Demobilization and budget cuts threatened 
again. As in the late 1940s, planners were forced to predict how future threats 
would influence defense requirements. Yet no new enemy emerged as a likely 
threat. Instead, the world appeared to be characterized by incredible 
uncertainty. In the place of the specific enemy and the known threat, planners 
focused on a concept and strategy known as asymmetric warfare. According to 
an Air Force scenario, STRATEGIC FORCE ’96: 
 
                                                           
26 Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 
1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge Unversity Press, 1998), 3. 
27 Sherry, 201 
28 Hogan, 1. 
29 Quoted in David Jablonsky, “The state of the national security state”, Parameters Winter 2002-3, 6. 
30 Jablonsky, for example, claims that “The end of the Cold War required the United States to think 
more deeply about the concept of national security than had been required for two generations.” 
Jablonsky, 10. 
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The symmetrical battles have typically pitted steel against steel in 
slow wars of attrition. Asymmetrical warfare departs from this 
thinking. Asymmetrical warfare avoids traditional force-on-force 
battles. Asymmetrical warfare favors pitting your strength against 
an enemy’s strength or weakness in a nontraditional and 
sometimes unconventional manner.31  
 
In the theory of asymmetric war, the uncertain threat and the unspecified 
enemy come to be understood as a new paradigm.32 Anthony Cordesman 
writes: 
 
What is clear is that homeland defense must respond to a 
constantly changing threat, especially to the kind that may be 
impossible to predict, the emergence of new patterns of attack 
for years to come…[The United States] cannot predict what new 
threats will or will not emerge, and…grave uncertainties exist 
regarding the emergence of new methods of attack and defense 
and the balance of technology between them. The world can 
evolve in radically different directions and is almost certain to do 
so.33  
 
Faced with the certainty of uncertainty, the military began (in theory) to prepare 
for a potentially infinite number of threats.  
 
The theory of asymmetric warfare temporally shifts the hermeneutics of war into 
an uncertain future rather than an historically determined present. Cordesman 
writes: 
  
George Santayana’s warning that those who fail to remember the 
past are condemned to repeat it is as valid as ever, but those 
who ignore the uncertainty of future change may well face far 
more serious problems.34  
 
Threat analysis increasingly involves the creation of ‘futures scenarios’ in order 
to facilitate predictions of this uncertain future. These scenarios range from 
text-based narratives of global political change to computerized role-plays of 
                                                           
31 Lloyd Matthews, ed. Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can the 
United States be Defeated? (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.] : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 1998). 
32 cf. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatarri, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987): 420-422 for analysis of the 
conceptual category of the ‘enemy’ as well as the ‘unspecified enemy’. 
33 Anthony Cordesman, Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, 
Conn.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002): 9.  
34 Ibid. 
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terrorist attacks.35 As these scripted scenarios reveal, what is certain for 
security planners is the vulnerability of the United States to asymmetric or non-
conventional attacks: in particular, attacks that target the civilian population.  
 
In recent years, national security has been reformulated into the concept and 
strategy of homeland security. Homeland security applies the theory of 
asymmetric warfare to expand the ideology of preparedness to encompass all 
of society.36 Ultimately, the enemy is not only left unspecified but displaced as 
the primary locus of concern. The possibility of endless insecurity is suggested. 
In his introductory letter to the National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
President Bush writes: 
 
We are today a Nation at risk to a new and changing threat. The 
terrorist threat to America takes many forms, has many places to 
hide, and is often invisible. Yet the need for homeland security is 
not tied solely to today’s terrorist threat. The need for homeland 
security is tied to our enduring vulnerability.37  
 
National Health 
 
Today, the federal government’s involvement in the health of the national 
population seems self-evident. The FY2005 budget of the Department of Health 
and Human Services, to note only one statistic, topped $539 billion dollars.38 
Yet before the Second World War, the federal government did not address 
public health or disease at the level of the national population in a consistent or 
coherent manner. City and state departments that focused only on their local 
areas dominated the practice of public health. 
 
The Marine Hospital Service, created in 1870, was the first federal institution to 
exclusively and permanently address health. However, its focus was localized, 
only involved with the care and relief of sick and injured merchant seamen. 
Within years, the responsibilities of the Hospital Service expanded into a more 
general control of infectious disease in the ports. The National Quarantine Act 
of 1878 subsequently conferred quarantine authority on the Service. At this 
                                                           
35 cf. National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence 
Council’s 2020 Project (December 2004). Available at: 
<http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html>; Dark Winter. Available at: 
<http://www.homelandsecurity.org/darkwinter/index.cfm>. 
36 Homeland security is “an exceedingly complex mission that requires coordinated and focused 
effort from our entire society–the federal government, state and local governments, the private sector, 
and the American people. National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
Homeland Security, 2002): vii. 
37 George W. Bush, Cover letter to National Strategy for Homeland Security [emphasis added]. 
38 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Budget in Brief: FY2005 (Washington, 
DC: Health and Human Services, 2005) [online]. Accessed from: 
<http://www.hhs.gov/budget/docbudget.htm> 
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time, disease was considered a threat to the national body, but only at the 
territorial orifices: ports. As immigration increased in the late nineteenth century, 
fears of contaminated boundaries abounded, often targeting newcomers as the 
cause of disease epidemics.39 In 1889, the responsibilities of the Service were 
formulated in terms of national defense. The organization became a 
commissioned corps, meaning that it is one of the uniformed services of the 
U.S. military.  
 
In 1902, the organization changed its name to the Public Health and Marine 
Service; in 1912, it became just the Public Health Service. The roles and 
responsibilities of the Service were expanding; yet it remained a subsidiary of 
the Treasury Department with no mandate to broadly address the health of the 
population. Things began to change during the Second World War. A small 
organization was formed under the auspices of the Public Health Service 
exclusively to fight malaria near domestic military bases. As the war came to a 
close, the staff of Malaria Control in War Areas (MCWA) began thinking about 
their role in the postwar peace. Joseph Mountin, MCWA director, was 
particularly interested in “getting the PHS [Public Health Service] into domestic 
health problems in the states.”40 Mountin wrote in a January 1942 memo that 
“the defense emergency could result in an improvement in civilian health; that 
after the war, services having to do with the general population could be 
developed.”41  
 
In 1946, the foundation of the Communicable Disease Center (CDC– now 
Centers for Disease Control) transformed the MCWA into a field station of the 
Bureau of State Services engaged exclusively in practical public health affairs. 
The Bureau linked the states with the Public Health Service and the foundation 
of the CDC was one important step in developing public health at the national 
level. 
 
Seven years later, the health of the national population would become 
institutionalized as a fundamental object of U.S. governmentality. In his 
foundational and influential work A History of Public Health [1958], George 
Rosen identifies the formation of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare in 1953 as a point of historical culmination. For the first time, the U.S. 
had a truly national health agency, one fitting “the modern conception that the 
national government is responsible for the health of the people.”42 For the first 
time, a coherent apparatus linked the health of the national population to the 
national government. 
 
                                                           
39 Nick King, “The influence of anxiety: September 11, Bioterrorism, and American Public Health,” 
Journal of the History of Medicine vol. 58, (October 2003): 434.  
40 Quoted in Melissa Etheridge, Sentinel for Health (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992): 16. 
41 Ibid. 
42 George Rosen, A History of Public Health (New York: MD Publications, 1958): 468. 
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During the 1970s, some commentators expanded Rosen’s teleology of national 
health into a sort of ‘end of history’ narrative heralding the end of infectious 
disease as a threat to man and nation.43 These hopes didn’t last long. 
Cutbacks in public health funding, expanding social inequality, and increases in 
global trade and travel combined to threaten the United States (along with 
many other places worldwide) with health disaster during the 1990s. Laurie 
Garret uses the term collapse to describe the repeated failures, shortcomings, 
and general disarray in the U.S. public health system.44  
 
While the national security challenges of the 1990s consolidated around the 
theory and strategy of asymmetry, public health problems were increasingly 
collected under the rubric of emerging infections. Emergence has been used to 
characterize a number of different public health threats: viral diseases that have 
emerged from a natural reservoirs, such as HIV or SARS; the re-emergence of 
infectious diseases previously thought under control, such as diphtheria in 
Eastern Europe; the emergence of bacteria resistant to multiple antibiotics after 
the over-prescription of these drugs, such as multi-drug resistant tuberculosis; 
and, most tellingly, the emergence of infectious diseases previously unknown in 
the developed world, such as West Nile viral encephalitis.45  
 
The concept of emergence, like that of asymmetry, transforms the temporality 
of knowledge and action. George Rosen’s concept of a modern, national health 
was built on a belief that a complete knowledge of disease was possible and a 
committed application of this knowledge could solve health problems. He 
writes: 
 
Today [1958], the community is in a better position than ever 
before to control its environment and so to preserve health and 
avert disease. More and more, man can consciously plan and 
organize his campaign for better health because available 
knowledge and resources make it possible for him in many 
instances to act with a clear understanding of what he is doing.46  
 
The optimism that postulates a perfect knowledge of the problem is exactly 
what is considered lacking in the case of emerging infections. An emergent 
epidemic is new, unusual, and unpredictable. Extant vaccines will not deflect 
them, nor will immunological antibodies protect new host populations. Perhaps 
the only thing certain about emerging infections is the likelihood that more will 
emerge. Stephen S. Morse argues that the rate of emergence is 
                                                           
43 William McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976). 
44 Laurie Garrett, Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health (New York: Hyperion, 2000). 
45 Stephen S. Morse, “Factors in the Emergence of Infectious Disease” Emerging Infectious Diseases 
vol. 1, no. 1, (January-March 1995): 7-15. See also more generally Morse, ed., Emerging Viruses (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
46 Rosen, 495. 
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“accelerating,,”47 and Christopher Chyba anticipates “that more “new” 
diseases will appear or take hold in the human population.”48  
 
 
“The apparition of our times”: 
The emergence of the bioterrorism threat 
 
During the late 1990s, the recently destabilized apparatuses of national security 
and public health were both challenged by a single danger: biological terrorism. 
The stimulus that brought the threat to public discourse was another historical 
conjuncture. In the early years of the decade, defectors revealed that the Soviet 
Union had concealed a secret biowarfare program long after ratifying the 
Biological Weapons Convention in 1972.49 Scientists had continued research 
into the 1980s on smallpox, anthrax, and other agents in an ostensibly civilian 
biological research institute known as Biopreperat. The contemporary 
whereabouts of researchers, labs, or materials (including live microbial cultures) 
were poorly known. Those with access to these classified discussions feared 
that weapons expertise or biological weapons could have leaked through the 
increasingly porous borders of the post-Soviet Republics.50  
 
The first responses to the biological terrorism threat came from within the 
national security apparatus. Bioweapons were lumped with nuclear and 
chemical weapons as a problem of proliferation. An emergency directive given 
by President Clinton best exemplifies the nonproliferation battle. In 1994, 
Clinton declared a national emergency “in light of the dangers of the 
proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass 
destruction") and of the means of delivering such weapons.” The directive 
argued for strengthened international agreements and sanctions against 
proliferators.51  
 
Within a few years, however, some national security experts hinted that the 
bioweapons problem was beyond their reach. The particular hybrid character of 
the bioweapon required what Christopher Chyba calls a “strategy of public 
                                                           
47 Morse, “Factors in the Emergence,” 7. 
48 Christopher F. Chyba, “Biological Terrorism, Emerging Diseases, and National Security” [online] 
Project on World Security, New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, (1998). Available at: 
http://www.rbf.org/pdf/Chyba_Bioterrorism.pdf 
49 The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (the "1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention") prohibits the production, testing, and stockpiling of biological weapons. 
50 Garrett, 481-494. 
51 William J. Clinton, “Presidential Letter to Congress on Non-Proliferation Activities” [online] Clinton 
Foundation [18 May, 1995Available at: http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/051895-presidential-
letter-to-congress-on-non-proliferation-activities.htm  
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health surveillance” unique among defense technologies.52 The bridge 
between the classified space of national security knowledge and the public 
health community was built by a single man: D.A. Henderson. Henderson is an 
epidemiologist renowned for his leadership in the global eradication of smallpox 
that also has a security clearance. Knowledgeable about biological weapons 
and their proliferation, he went public in a March 1998 speech to the first 
International Conference on Emerging and Infectious Diseases. Henderson 
began, 
 
Until recently the subject of biological terrorism has been little 
discussed or written about in the medical literature or, for that 
matter, in the public press. 
And then, the moment of revelation:  
 
We now know that there are nations and dissident groups who 
have both the motivation and access to skills to selectively 
cultivate some of the most dangerous pathogens and to deploy 
them in acts of terrorism or war.53  
 
Deploying the language of asymmetric warfare, Henderson argued that the 
biological weapons threat is a novel concern for public health. Yet fifty years 
earlier, in what I have described as the formative moment for both the national 
security state and the national health apparatus, none other than his teacher 
and mentor made public a nearly identical bioweapons problematic.  
 
Alexander Languimir and the Surveillance of the Epidemic Nation 
 
Alexander Languimir navigated the intertwined worlds of war and health during 
the 1940s as these techno-political domains were consolidated in the 
apparatuses of national security and national health. In particular, he brought 
the two domains together through his theorization of biological warfare. He 
articulated a public health responsibility for biological warfare defense 
embodied in the organization he called the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS). 
The methods pioneered by this organization ultimately became a model for 
general public health practice worldwide, most famously during the global 
eradication of smallpox led by D.A. Henderson (himself a member of the EIS). 
Languimir’s key contribution to public health practice was a method of 
epidemiological surveillance that followed every instance of a disease within the 
territorial space of the nation state, organizing what I call a ‘nation of 
epidemics’. Ironically, perhaps, it is this nation and the related methods of 
surveillance that are critiqued within the contemporary bioweapons discourse. 
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Languimir graduated with a Master’s in Public Health from Johns Hopkins in 
1940. He immediately began public health practice at the New York State 
Institute of Health. As the United States entered World War II in 1942, Languimir 
accepted a post as epidemiologist for the Commission on Acute Respiratory 
Diseases at Fort Bragg, NC. 54  
 
When the war ended, he returned to Johns Hopkins as an associate professor 
of epidemiology. At Hopkins, he became close friends with professor of 
bacteriology and epidemiology Kenneth Maxcy. Along with his academic 
duties, Maxcy served on the Committee on Biological Warfare. The highly 
classified committee, created in 1941, developed the U.S. program and policy 
for biological warfare. As friend and fellow epidemiologist, Languimir often filled 
in for Maxcy on the committee. When Macxy fell ill with Parkinson’s disease, 
Languimir rook over full time. As early as 1947, Languimir also served on the 
Army Chemical Corps’ Administrative Council, the organization involved in 
offensive biological weapons research. By 1949, he had a higher security 
clearance than the surgeon general and firsthand expertise with biological 
weapons.55  
 
In that year, he was appointed Chief Epidemiologist at the CDC, only recently 
emerged from the war-era organization Malaria Control in War Areas. The 
organization had no clear mandate and no secure footing within the state 
bureaucracy. Languimir quickly brought up the spectre of biological warfare as 
a problematic that needed to be addressed by public health and, more 
specifically, with epidemiological methods. In October, 1949 he told a meeting 
of state health officials that the food and water supplies were particularly 
vulnerable to biological attack.56  
 
Two months later, the National Security Resources Board declared that civil 
defense planning must account for all types of enemy attack, including 
biological warfare. Languimir developed the CDC’s technical response to the 
biological weapons threat at a meeting of the Public Health Service in July 
1950. While Truman geared up for war in Korea, biological warfare dominated 
the conference. In particular, the problem of detecting an unannounced 
bioweapons attack focused concern. As Languimir later reported, there was 
“common agreement [at the meeting] that the basic need was for the 
development of strong epidemiological investigation of all types of epidemics 
occurring anywhere in the nation.”57  
                                                           
54 “Alexander Languimir–A Brief Biographical Sketch” American Journal of Epidemiology vol. 144, no. 
8, suppl. (1996): S1. 
55 Elizabeth Fee and Theodore M. Brown, “Preemptive Biopreparedness: Can we learn anything from 
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56 Etheridge, 36. 
57 Etheridge, 42. 
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Out of the meeting came a new division within the CDC which Languimir called 
the Epidemic Intelligence Service. EIS recruits were members of the Public 
Health Service commissioned corps. Each recruit served a two-year, active 
duty epidemiological assignment under the direction of Languimir. They 
simultaneously studied theory in specially designed courses with Johns 
Hopkins public health professors and actively investigated real epidemics. 
Upon completion of the two-year assignment, the graduates continued to be on 
reserve for emergency call-up by the EIS.58 The EIS investigated every 
potential epidemic reported by physicians upon request from the states. In 
order to detect and defend against a deliberate epidemic, every epidemic had 
to be characterized and controlled.  
 
Out of the EIS grew two conceptualizations that Languimir fleshed out in 
subsequent articles. The first was what he called a “logical statement of a 
‘theory of biological warfare.’” 59 In a Public Health Reports article entitled “The 
potentialities of biological warfare against man” [1951], Languimir attempted to 
scientifically justify the participation of public health in national defense by 
defining biological warfare in terms of “experimental observations and rationally 
organized epidemiological principles.” He wrote, “if only a small area could be 
defined to which all professionally qualified persons could agree, this would 
form the basis for such a theory.”60  
 
To do so, he begins with the claims made by the recently published Executive 
Office document “Health Services and Special Weapons Defense” that 
speculate on methods of biological attack. According to the document, there 
are two: “the creation of clouds of pathogenic aerosols over cities”; and “the 
contamination of our water or food supplies.”61 After a lengthy theoretical 
discussion, Languimir concluded, “the epidemiology of airborne infection and 
of common vehicle [i.e., food and water supplies] epidemics forms the basis for 
developing a theory of biological warfare.”62 Rather than medicine or 
laboratory biology, Languimir argued that epidemiology and public health were 
the tools for understanding biological warfare. 
 
In relation to this theory, Languimir articulated and defined what has recently 
been called the modern definition of public health surveillance.63 Languimir 
argued that the term surveillance was “not new to public health” but that he 
                                                           
58 Alexander Languimir, “The Epidemic Intelligence Service of the Center for Disease Control,” Public 
Health Reports vol. 95, no. 5, (September-October 1980): 470-477. 
59 Alexander Languimir, “Potentialities of biological warfare,” Public Health Reports vol. 66, no. 13, (30 
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60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid.: 388 
62 Ibid.: 397. 
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used the concept differently.64 Earlier, pubic health surveillance had typically 
been “applied to individuals rather than diseases.” This meant the close 
observation of individuals “in order to detect the early signs of sickness without 
restricting . . . freedom of movement.” Focused on the individual, such a regime 
of surveillance was only feasible within confined spaces or under emergency 
conditions. In contrast, surveillance of disease is the “continued watchfulness 
over the distribution and trends of incidence through systematic collection, 
consolidation and evaluation of morbidity and mortality data and other relevant 
data.”65 The data that could be collected within this new regime of surveillance 
included diagnosis and laboratory evidence, as well as the age, sex, ethnicity 
and place of residence of the patient.66  
 
Surveillance was shifted from the examination of disease in an individual to the 
incidence or rate of disease in a population. Underlying this technical method of 
surveillance is a particular philosophy of disease. The EIS was based on the 
theory that: 
 
Infectious disease exists because neither the host nor the 
parasite can destroy the other. They have achieved an unstable 
biological balance. Epidemiology is concerned with the factors 
that cause this balance to fluctuate, the object being to provide a 
scientific basis for altering those trends in favor of man.67  
 
Understanding this balance, and the potential for imbalance in favor of either 
man or disease, required an understanding of the regularities of disease in the 
population. Languimir from the beginning of his time at the CDC emphasized 
the importance of consistent and consolidated morbidity and mortality 
reporting. By 1963, his efforts transferred the collection of these reports from 
the Office of Vital Statistics to the CDC, greatly expanding the detail of 
surveillance. 
 
Languimir organized what I call a nation of epidemics, that is, a national space 
in which every epidemic was watched and monitored. The EIS technology 
opened up a new pathological domain in which disease was defined in terms of 
the nation and the national population. For the first time, every epidemic in the 
nation was made visible and placed under careful surveillance. The regularities 
of illness and death for the national population were also consolidated and 
statistically analyzed for the first time. 
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Languimir’s theory and practice of disease surveillance spread to public health 
organizations worldwide. During the 1960s, the World Health Organization 
endorsed Languimir’s disease surveillance as a key public health strategy. The 
Technical Discussions of the World Health Assembly in 1968 focused entirely 
on disease surveillance, addressing it as an already widely established and 
essential public health practice.68 During the 1970s, D.A. Henderson (a former 
member of the Epidemic Intelligence Service) was appointed to lead the WHO 
effort to globally eradicate smallpox. As Henderson notes in an article on the 
subject, many scientists at the time were skeptical about the possibility of 
global eradication. Unfazed, Henderson argued that a vociferous surveillance 
program could ensure “that the number of smallpox cases reaches ‘0’.”69 After 
ten years of vaccination and surveillance, smallpox was eliminated, forming the 
high point in the dream of a global ‘end of epidemics’.  
 
Ironically, perhaps, Henderson himself has been pivotal in raising the spectre of 
bioterrorism and criticizing existing surveillance measures. As director of the 
Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies founded in 1998, Henderson led 
the call for innovative improvements in disease surveillance. The call for more 
surveillance reflects a continuity with Languimir’s postulation of a visible 
epidemic nation. However, the epidemic threat has lost its certitude and 
surveillance technology has subsequently mutated. The application of 
surveillance to smallpox during the eradication program had a known object: 
cases of smallpox. The goal of the program was to discover the peculiar 
regularities of disease transmission in order to improve the efficiencies of 
vaccination programs. For example, in 1967 one investigator in Nigeria 
discovered that the spread of smallpox could be interrupted through highly 
targeted, containment vaccination rather than mass vaccination of entire 
populations.70 Surveillance for bioterrorism (and in particular syndromic 
surveillance technologies) operate with a fundamentally different logic. Rather 
than epidemiological characterization of a known target, bioterrorism 
surveillance emphasizes the rapid recognition of the unknown. As the 2000 
CDC study of the surveillance infrastructure argued, “strong surveillance is 
needed to identify these events at the earliest sign in order to trigger an 
immediate response.”71  
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Syndromic Surveillance: A New Pathological Domain 
 
In the past ten years, the experimental syndromic surveillance system 
implemented by the New York City public health department has become a 
model for an emerging defense apparatus. Out of a contingent response to the 
failures of traditional disease surveillance has emerged a technique that attracts 
“widespread interest” for its potential ability “to detect a large-scale bioterrorist 
attack in its early stages.”72 The result has been what two New York City 
health officials describe as a “flood of interest and funding” as “a surveillance 
methodology virtually unknown just a few years ago is now poised for 
deployment across the nation.”73  
 
The story begins inconspicuously with the kind of epidemic that historically has 
frequently problematized the techno-political governance of populations.74 In 
1993, an epidemic of diarrheal Crypto spordium in Milwaukee that sickened 
over four thousand people went undetected by public health disease 
surveillance. A pharmacist who noticed large sales of over the counter anti-
diarrheal drugs was the first to sound an alarm, and the local media publicly 
reported the epidemic days before the health department took action.75 The 
failure embarrassed and frightened public health officials across the country. 
According to Ronald Glasser, the Milwaukee outbreak was widely seen as “a 
clear sign that our infectious-disease and medical surveillance and prevention 
programs were no longer working.”76  
 
Two years later, the New York City public health department77 (NYCDH) 
implemented the first prospective surveillance system for so-called ‘non-
specific health indicator data’: loosely, symptoms or syndromes rather than 
diagnoses. With Milwaukee’s experience in mind, the system was designed to 
detect a large epidemic of diarrheal disease in its early stages. Rather than 
heightening the sensitivity of the traditional surveillance system, perhaps by 
enhancing the vigilance of clinicians and laboratories for cases of Crypto, this 
syndromic technique collected data on diarrheal illness that disregarded 
diagnosis entirely. Each of the three data sources under surveillance–cases of 
diarrheal illness at sentinel nursing homes; cases of diarrheal stool submissions 
at labs; and sales of over the counter anti-diarrheal drugs–tabulated cases of 
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diarrhea rather than the specific causative species.78 Disease surveillance as 
established by Languimir had emphasized investigating known epidemics in 
progress. This diarrheal syndromic system, on the other hand, routinely 
collected health information in order to detect the emergence of an epidemic in 
its early stages. 
 
Three years later, in 1998, a conjuncture of two factors radically transformed 
the horizons of the experimental system. The first was the emergence of 
bioterrorism as a problem for public health. D.A. Henderson gave his definitive 
speech to the International Conference on Emerging and Infectious Diseases 
about the imminent bioterrorism threat that year; New York City quickly 
emerged as a likely site for such attacks. In collaboration with the Fire 
Department, NYCDH began monitoring 911 emergency calls for “indicators of 
biological terrorism.”79  
 
Secondly, the new system shifted from a paper-based to an electronic 
reporting system. Emergency calls are routinely entered into an electronic 
database in order to facilitate ambulance dispatch.80 By mining a database 
that already existed in electronic form, the surveillance system only needed to 
reroute information to the health department. Initially, data was manually 
forwarded by e-mail every day; later, an automatic transmission mechanism 
was developed that delivered batches of call data to the health department 
multiple times a day.81 This approach towards real-time data collection 
remains one of the most exciting attributes of syndromic surveillance for its 
proponents.82  
 
The consolidation of this interest into a focused and funded plan for national 
defense occurred in the aftermath of “9/11.”83 The date did not mark an 
epochal transition: rather, technologies and discourses set in motion long 
before broke the surface of public and political awareness.84 Along with 
enhanced passive reporting, New York City public health built a third syndromic 
surveillance system within one day of the attacks because of concern about 
possible bioterrorism.85 Implemented in fifteen sentinel hospitals, the system 
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collected data on every patient that visited the emergency department twenty-
four hours a day. In its early stages, Epidemic Intelligence Service Officers 
(EISOs) directed by the CDC assisted physicians and nurses in completing one-
page forms on patient syndromes. To facilitate completing forms, EISOs 
educated, verbally encouraged, and provided incentives such as food and 
candy to nurses and physicians. The EISOs, equipped with laptop computers 
and two-way radios, entered this information into databases from which a 
citywide data set was created at the end of the day.86  
 
Manual data collection continued for two months on an emergency footing. 
However, an EISO survey revealed that manual collection caused delays and 
inconsistencies. The system was also costly in terms of human work hours.87 
In November, the syndromic surveillance of ER visits shifted to an electronic 
network utilizing e-mail or automatic file transfer and the EIS workers left. The 
transition between two surveillance regimes could not be clearer. The program 
began as an emergency response enacted by the Epidemic Intelligence 
Service, but it became a routine biodefense surveillance program. Disease 
surveillance went from an emergency to a routine practice. 
 
While New York City health officials acknowledged that the system was no 
substitute for clinicians with “a high index of suspicion,” and the only 
bioterrorist attack that occurred (the anthrax mailings) was too small-scale to 
be detected, syndromic surveillance had burst onto the national scene.88 On 
September 23rd and 24th, 2002 the NYCDH and the New York Academy of 
Medicine hosted the first National Conference on Syndromic Surveillance in 
New York City with the assistance of a bioterrorism grant from the Sloan 
Foundation.89 Over four hundred public health practitioners, computer 
scientists, physicians, lawyers, and statisticians attended the conference from a 
global array of government, industry and military institutions. Over fifty 
presentations addressed topics ranging from the legal basis for syndromic 
systems, potential standards for system evaluation and data transmission, and 
nontraditional data sources.  
 
In short, the event brought a lot of technical expertise into a single area in order 
to consolidate syndromic surveillance as a technology. As an online summary 
of the conference puts it,  
 
this timely and important conference provided a forum for 
participants to define the rapidly evolving science of syndromic 
surveillance, review and evaluate existing systems and discuss 
                                                           
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., i86. 
88 Ibid., i86-87. 
89 cf. Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Accessed from: 
<http://www.sloan.org/programs/pg_national.shtml#bioterror> 
 
 
Fearnley / From Chaos to Controlled Disorder 
 22 
methodologies, opportunities and challenges in this emerging 
field. 90  
 
Along with its technical consolidation, the conference fleshed out connections 
between the emerging technology and the techno-political apparatuses of the 
state Two of the opening talks built structural links between syndromic 
surveillance and the dual realms of public health and national security. Margaret 
Hamburg of the Nuclear Threat Initiative91 spoke on ‘Putting Syndromic 
Surveillance in Context (National Preparedness)’; while Michael T. Osterholm, a 
public health practitioner from Minnesota spoke on “Putting Syndromic 
Surveillance in Context (Public Health)’.92  
 
A second conference the next year encouraged the spread of syndromic 
surveillance to public health practice across the country. Using the New York 
City syndromic systems as an exemplary model, the conference centered on a 
three-day workshop for state and local public health practitioners interested in 
developing their own syndromic surveillance.93 Today most states and four 
federal agencies operate at least one syndromic surveillance system. Notable 
among the federal programs are the ESSENCE system built by the Department 
of Defense and the BioSense system built by the CDC. A few systems are 
emerging that are nationwide in scope. Both BioSense and the Pittsburgh 
developed National Retail Data Monitor utilize pharmaceutical sales information 
from major national retail chains.94 Slowly and not necessarily directly, the 
pathological domain under syndromic surveillance has expanded. Beginning 
with a single experimental system, expanding to address bioterrorism, and 
finally taking in a national domain, the process has involved hesitant 
articulations with both public health and national security institutions. At stake 
in this expansion is a fundamental shift in the use of disease surveillance. In 
Languimir’s model, disease surveillance had been an investigative procedure 
modeled on the methods of the crime sleuth. The epidemic problem was 
known: the problem was figuring out what had caused it. Syndromic 
surveillance, on the other hand, makes no active attempt to characterize or 
describe epidemics. Instead, it only attempts to detect them and does so 
through the routine collection of data. 
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Displacing the Clinical Diagnosis: 
The New Epidemic Registers 
 
The transformation of human disease into knowledge or meaning is an unstable 
and historically determined interpretive practice. The foundations of the clinic, 
and its particular diagnostic relationship between doctor and patient, are not so 
old. In the seventeenth century, the cause of disease was determined through 
two techniques in conversation: the ill person’s vocalized description of 
symptoms; and the physician’s visual analysis of bodily ‘signs.’ The 
developments of anatomy in the early nineteenth century and, later, a number 
of machinic visual aids, gave increasing precedent to the physician’s 
interpretation (often of mechanical readouts) over the expressive speech of the 
sick.95 Foucault describes this as the ‘anatamo-clinical’ method in which the 
anatomy of the corpse is “embodied in the living bodies of individuals.”96 
Diagnosis is practice of subjectification in which patients come to know 
themselves as individual living beings (subjects, in Foucault’s terms) through 
the interpretive examination of the doctor.    
 
Traditional surveillance depends on diagnostic reports. The clinical diagnosis is 
at the heart of its assumptions about disease, though these reports are 
collected into a population. The technology of syndromic surveillance reveals 
dramatically different assumptions about the status of the sick, the space of the 
clinic, and knowledge of disease. The distrust of the clinical diagnosis in the 
face of the unexpected epidemic leads to a revaluation of the ill person’s 
understanding of what is wrong with themselves. Through the patient’s 
vocalized complaints or their consumption of pharmaceuticals, a new image of 
disease emerges for interpretation. Yet this is not a conversation and it is not 
oriented towards determining the correct actions for improvement or cure in the 
individual patient. Instead, the ill person’s performance of suffering is translated 
into a standardized syndrome. For example, if a person buys cough syrup, the 
syndromic system interprets this as a case of influenza-like illness. An analysis 
of three nontraditional data sources exploited by NYCDH syndromic 
surveillance–911 emergency calls, ER chief complaints, and pharmaceutical 
sales–allows an examination of the displacement of the clinical diagnosis and 
the construction of alternative epidemiological registers. 
 
Emergency Calls 
 
New York is a city of emergencies. Over a million 911 calls are made each year 
requesting ambulance service (almost three thousand per day). Despite their 
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frequency, NYCDH syndromics workers believed that emergency ambulance 
dispatch calls were an untapped epidemic register. Of particular interest was 
the EMS call database. Each 911 caller’s emergency complaint is fielded by an 
EMS dispatcher and routinely entered into a database. The database is 
categorized into fifty-two call types, ranging from ARREST to CARD (cardiac) to 
ABDPN (abdominal pain).97 In this computerized form, the caller’s complaint is 
automatically dispatched to ambulances across the city.98 The syndromics 
workers exploited this differentiated collection of emergencies by identifying a 
limited number of call-types that correlated with specific health syndromes. 
They concluded that four call types (RESPIR-repiratory, DIFBR-difficulty 
breathing, SICK-sick adult, and SICPED-sick pediatric) most closely correlated 
with cases of the syndrome influenza-like illness. Flu-like illness is an important 
syndrome, of course, because many likely bioweapons appear similar to 
common flu in their prodromal stages. 
 
Traditional public health surveillance monitored reports of clinical and 
laboratory expert judgment. Knowledge of disease was based on firsthand 
expert interpretations of patients or cultures.99 In this syndromic system on the 
contrary, the exclusive source of information is the callers vocal description of 
their suffering performed in the 911 call. Recovering and interpreting this 
performance is a multi-stepped process of translation. First, a caller tells the 
dispatcher that they have an emergency, such as difficulty breathing; then, the 
caller’s vocal complaint is translated to an EMS call-type (DIFBR); finally, this 
call-type is translated into a syndrome such as influenza-like illness.  
 
Through this process of translation, public health can track the numbers of 
specific syndromes in the restricted population of 911 callers. The 
characteristics of this population are important as well. Emergency requests for 
ambulance service are not typically made for routine illness but due to severe 
symptoms. Thus, this population is already bounded by the characteristic of 
severity, of emergency. This creates a surveillance bias that, depending on 
what one is looking for, either improves or worsens the sensitivity of the 
system. A follow-up analysis of emergency department clinical records 
demonstrated that nineteen per cent of ambulance arrivals were over the age of 
sixty-five. Ambulance arrivals were also more likely to suffer from extreme 
symptoms. According to the authors, this made the system better at detecting 
a bioweapon with severe prodromal stages, such as inhalational anthrax.  
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Chief Complaints 
 
At almost every emergency department in the United States, health care is 
routinely administered through a triage system. French military surgeons 
developed the method of triage (from French trier-to sort) in order to prioritize 
care to those who needed it most in the difficult context of battlefield medicine. 
At emergency departments before the mid-20th century, patients were often 
cared for on a first-come, first-serve basis. Today, triage both prioritizes and 
differentiates care. Not only is the neediest cared for first, but patients that 
require specialist attention are sent to particular parts of the hospital (for 
example, pregnant women are sent to obstetrics). Determining triage is entirely 
subjective, however, and is most often performed by a nurse. The potential for 
costly mistakes is high. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor 
Act mandates that all triage interactions must be documented and form part of 
the patient’s permanent medical record.100 Along with basic information about 
the patient such as age, gender, and home zip code, triage nurses record the 
patient’s articulation of their symptoms–a so-called chief complaint–in a free-
text field. According to Kristi Metzger, often the computerized record is the 
actual vocalization of the patient such as “I have a fever” or “coughing for two 
weeks.”101  
 
New York City public health officials identified these triage logs–databases of 
triage information–as potential epidemic registers. Today, the ED syndromic 
system electronically collects data from forty-eight hospitals encompassing 
eighty-six per cent of total annual emergency visits in New York City. While a 
number of data fields are collected (hospital name, date, mode of arrival, 
gender, age, etc.), the primary field under surveillance is the chief complaint. At 
the public health department, a computer algorithm analyzes the chief 
complaints for key text strings (such as “fever” or “cough”) that can be coded 
into ICD-9 syndromes.102  
 
The collection and analysis of chief complaint data reflects the increased trust 
in the ill person’s expression of their suffering (dissolved in a population) rather 
than the clinical diagnosis of an expert. The patient’s speech is taken at face 
value: NYCDH emphasizes to its ED partners that they should not truncate the 
chief complaint field which can be up to 200 characters long.103 However, this 
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data provides no reciprocal knowledge about the individual patient. In fact, 
personal identifiers such as name, date of birth, and social security number are 
actively suppressed.104 The individual performance of suffering is taken out of 
the clinic and thrown into an epidemiological network. Medical intervention is 
not about a face-to-face encounter between carer and cared, expert and client; 
instead it turns individual behaviors into abstract factors within a fluctuating 
population flow.105 
 
Drug Markets 
 
For many years, pharmaceutical sales data has been believed to closely 
correlate with outbreaks of certain types of illness.106 . In 2002, NYCDH 
cemented a partnership with a New York-based pharmacy chain to monitor 
sales of over-the-counter drugs. Putting 248 stores in the city (thirty per cent of 
total over-the-counter sales in the city) under surveillance allowed a program 
with citywide scope to begin. At Duane Reade stores, sales information is 
automatically entered into a computerized database when UPC barcodes are 
scanned at the cash register. The database typically collects this information for 
marketing purposes; thus in a model agreement with an anonymous firm, the 
NYCDH agreed to deem all data “confidential and a trade secret.”107 The 
database company hands over only raw data for the previous day: NABP (store 
number); store zip code; UPC number; date of sale; etc.108  
 
Market trends, the “significant increase in sales of certain medications,” are 
believed to indicate possible outbreaks.109 Through a mutation in the classical 
economic theory of rational market choice, consumer demand is assumed to 
directly reflect not only social wants or needs, but a population’s 
epidemiological status.110 Each product is categorized by general class; in an 
example form distributed, these included cough suppressants, decongestants, 
antihistamines, and anti-diarrheals. Through a reverse translation from solution 
to problem, sales product categories are then grouped by the syndromes they 
claim to solve: thus cough suppressants and antihistamines are collated to 
determine the number of people suffering from influenza-like illness; anti-
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diarrheal sales reflect the number of people suffering from diarrhea. Rather than 
a clinical diagnosis of specific disease in an individual body, pharmaceutical 
based syndromic surveillance turns market trends into a picture of the flows of 
suffering across a population. This population is assumed to live in and through 
markets; the pharmacy outlet has encroached on the clinic as primary site of 
health care and cure. 
  
 
Normed Pasts, Pathological Futures 
 
The data collected and sorted by syndromes remains essentially meaningless. 
Another set of techniques is required to construct a population in which the 
emergence of an exceptional epidemic is visible. The way that raw information 
is organized and given meaning reflects the rationality guiding the system’s 
construction. Analyzing this basically interpretive process reveals the political 
assumptions built into the technology: the logos that directs the techniques.  
 
Kevin Konty points out that there are two philosophies on how to analyze a 
population of syndromes in order to detect a bioweapon initiated epidemic: 
signature and significance. Signature analytics compares observed data to an 
‘alternative hypothesis’: a trend line plotted according to predictive 
assumptions about how an epidemic for a certain agent would look. Though 
good at restricting response to what can be determined to be a dangerous 
epidemic, signature analytics requires a foreknowledge of the characteristics of 
the biological agent in question.  
 
The New York City system, on the contrary, is based explicitly on the 
assumption that this knowledge is lacking. NYCDH therefore looks instead for 
significance: identifying the truly aberrant health trend. The basic method, as 
Kevin put it, is to develop some idea of the status quo [a norm] and then watch 
to see if their is a break from it. The massive amounts of data collected by the 
syndromic network–literally thousands of pieces of information per day–is 
organized by a computer into a number of normed populations. Norm refers to 
a basic determination of value: in this case, the distinction between the normal 
state and the epidemic state. The problem is how to turn a quantified 
continuum (the absolute number of observed syndromes in a population) into a 
qualitative binary that distinguishes normal from epidemic.111 Syndromic 
surveillance systems must be able to determine the critical point (a certain 
number of observed syndromes) that signifies the presence of an epidemic. 
Most of the work done by the syndromic tech staff is adjusting this critical point 
in order to minimize both false-positives and false-negatives. 
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NYCDH refers to this point as a signal: the “statistically significant aberration” 
from the norm. This norm is not a mere average. Rather, the norm is the 
statistical range (determined through a number of methods) in which 
syndromes fluctuate ‘normally.’ The signal point, on the other hand, is not a 
fixed numerical ceiling of syndrome cases. The signal is not just a fluctuation in 
the absolute number of cases, but a ranked aberration from the normal range. 
In other words, syndromic surveillance attempts to recognize and rank the 
improbable when it occurs. The more unlikely a certain spike in syndromes is, 
the more likely that it will trigger a signal.    
 
The goal ultimately is to detect an unexpected, improbable epidemic in its 
emergent stages. This prospective surveillance restricts its analysis to “alive 
clusters” of syndrome cases in order to “detect ongoing epidemics” that are in 
danger of spreading further.112 Kevin Konty noted that in order to justify 
funding, syndromic surveillance must be able to detect the presence of an 
epidemic quicker than other surveillance systems. Due to this “desire to quickly 
detect outbreaks (especially those due to bioterrorism)” the ED chief complaint 
program has been tuned to detect increases in syndromes that occur within 
one to three days, rather than outbreaks that have been slowly growing for a 
longer time.113  
 
Kevin compares the statistical method of aberration detection with techniques 
employed to detect credit card theft. By statistically analyzing a cardholder’s 
buying patterns, this method is able to identify aberrant purchases and 
automatically cancel the card. Syndromic surveillance, on the other hand, 
analyzes the syndromal patterns of a population in order to detect an aberrant 
(and therefore perhaps epidemic) rate of syndrome cases.  
 
The basic practice underlying the method of aberration detection is 
comparison: the comparison between statistically calculated norms and 
observed syndrome-totals. The norm is an alternative hypothetical value, similar 
to the control group utilized in standard experimental practice. However, 
whereas the control group (in cancer epidemiology, for example) is typically a 
second, placebo group under surveillance, in a syndromic system these control 
groups are cast into the historical past. Rather than comparing two 
contemporary groups, syndromics compares a historical control to a present, 
real-time observation. The historical control represents the number of syndrome 
cases that are expected to occur under normal conditions. Aberrations from 
this norm thus become recognizable as signals of a possible epidemic. 
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Determining the normal syndromal patterns of a population requires a number 
of methods. It is important to emphasize here that the populations in question 
are not composed of every New York City resident. These are specifically 
delimited populations (populations of ER visitors, 911 callers, or pharmaceutical 
consumers) that are believed to best approximate the syndromal status of the 
citywide population during an epidemic. Determining the syndromal norm first 
requires a retrospective analysis of historical data from each of these sources. 
Normal fluctuations in historical data can be used to adjust the expected 
comparative norm For example, normal syndromal trends related to season, 
holidays, day-of-week and environmental temperature have been factored into 
the comparative norm. An increase in flu-like illness syndromes during the 
winter will be far less likely to produce a signal than a similar increase in 
summertime.114 Adjustments are made according to their predictive utility, that 
is, how consistently that shift (such as expecting more flu-like cases in winter) 
will reduce false-positives and false-negatives in historical data. Yet intervention 
is kept at a minimum. In our conversation, Kevin Konty cited the principal of 
parsimony, the principle that one should always choose the simplest 
explanation of a phenomenon.   
 
In technical terms, the statistical determination of a normed population 
resembles the characteristic political rationality Foucault described as 
biopolitics. Focused on the population as object of knowledge and intervention, 
biopolitical techniques identify and adjust the regularities (norms) of mass 
biological existence: birth rates, mortality rates, life expectancies, or in this 
case, syndrome rates. As Foucault wrote, in biopolitical government “security 
mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a 
population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life.”115 More 
specifically, the predictive normalization of the future employed by syndromic 
surveillance resembles certain biopolitical technologies of social insurance.116  
 
Yet in fundamental ways syndromic surveillance adopts these technologies only 
to displace them. Where insurance technology argued that the accidents of fate 
in fact fell with calculable regularity, syndromic surveillance calculates the 
normal future only to be able to recognize the unpredictably aberrant. The same 
research is still being done: collecting historical rates of illness in a population, 
analyzing its fluctuations, and determining norms. Yet these carefully 
determined norms are not used to quantify or capitalize risk. Instead, the 
normed regularities of illness are only the background over which the 
significantly aberrant is expected to appear.  
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Francois Ewald writes of insurance technology that “to calculate a risk is to 
master time, to discipline the future.”117 Syndromic surveillance assumes the 
inevitability of the unpredictable, unknown epidemic: the inevitability of a 
pathological future. Rather than disciplining the unpredictable, it only attempts 
to ensure its recognition. The future is defined by the expectation of 
exceptionality, an exceptionality that cannot be disciplined or capitalized but 
only monitored and controlled.  
 
 
The (In) Security of Controlled Disorder 
 
The enlistment of syndromic surveillance as a technology of vigilance against 
bioweapons dramatically refigures the structures of security. In the circuits of 
warfare, technologies of vigilance are sentinels, mechanisms that ensure the 
enemy is visible and can therefore be repelled. As such, the boundaries of their 
vision are also the boundaries of the defendable, of the secure. As Manuel 
Delanda argues, the boundaries of security produce the interiority that is the 
civil, political domain. When radar was first developed, for example, its vigilance 
was technologically limited to the territorial perimeter of the state. Later, 
however, the United States expanded the radar curtain to enclose the entire 
continent and ultimately, through the development of the nuclear umbrella, 
“enlarged its ‘walls’ to global proportions.118 The enemy (and in particular 
nuclear armaments) had nowhere to hide. 
 
The assumptions and vigilance capacity of syndromic surveillance are far 
different than the integrated radar system, characterized by uncertainty rather 
than global vision. Even vigilance over the territory is considered impossible: 
 
Because of the incubation delays, no nation can protect itself 
(from biological attack) simply by screening travelers at its 
borders. Nor can a country such as the United States hope to 
inspect more than a fraction of the food it imports daily. As 
agricultural markets become increasingly global, the potential 
vulnerability of nations to food-borne natural or intentional 
disease will continue to increase.119  
 
Rather than the territory of the state, the boundaries of syndromic vigilance run 
through the living bodies of the population. Only days after a bioweapon has 
been released, when the sick begin to appear at emergency rooms and 
hospitals, will any sign of the enemy’s presence emerge. Rather than looking 
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for invasions across protected space (as radar does, for example), syndromic 
surveillance monitors fluctuations in syndrome levels over time.  
 
At stake is an assumed inability to prevent or defend against bioweapons 
attacks. As Dr. William Roper narrated, while “the public’s expectations, not 
surprisingly, called for 100% protection with no risks,” the “goal of public health 
is to minimize risks.” In this context, the task of syndromic surveillance is to 
“shorten the time from absolute chaos to controlled disorder.”120 Giorgio 
Agamben glosses Foucault’s concept of security in order to articulate the shifts 
in contemporary geopolitical rationality. He writes: 
 
While disciplinary power isolates and closes off territories, 
measures of security lead to an opening and globalisation; while 
the law wants to prevent and prescribe, security wants to 
intervene in ongoing processes to direct them. In a word, 
discipline wants to produce order, while security wants to guide 
disorder.121  
 
Biodefense disease surveillance guides and manages the “controlled disorder” 
of the microbe-human ecology in an increasingly contagious world. One can 
perhaps imagine then a secured population spreading beyond the confines of 
the national territory. The future of war in an 'asymmetric' age certainly does 
not appear to be one that emphasizes the defense of borders. Rather, specific 
populations are watched and managed to ensure that the “controlled disorder” 
of global flows of goods, people, microbes do not develop into the chaos of 
epidemic. 
 
 
Thoughts on Uncertain Times 
 
To conclude, I want to meditate on the temporality of syndromic observation 
and, subsequently, my own ethnographic observation. The objects and 
problems posed by these two modes of inquiry (technological and 
anthropological) are quite distinct. Yet both share the temporal space of the 
contemporary and the aspiration of understanding our time.122 In important 
ways, the semantics of temporality are in crisis. The history of progress that 
defined the modern imagination has begun to fade. The destructive 
consequences of so-called progress are ever more visible, particularly in 
ecological damage but also in global poverty and violence. At the same time, 
dreams of a perfectible future are ever more difficult to hold. From assymetric 
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warfare to emerging infectious diseases, the future is increasingly presented as 
uncertain but potentially catastrophic. 
 
The rise of apocalyptic eschatologies is one social response to present 
uncertainty. The logic is not foreign to the bioterrorism discourse. Monica 
Schoch-Spana, for one, has demonstrated that bioterrorism scenarios used to 
imagine possible futures have an apocalyptic character.123 In these texts, 
computer games, and role-playing drills the threat of bioterrorism is assumed at 
the outset to be inevitable: in Schoch-Spana’s words, not a matter of if, but 
when. In turn, the inevitable threat is narrated in catastrophic terms. In the 
response-game Dark Winter, for example, smallpox quickly spread beyond the 
control of the role-playing government, infecting tens of thousands and quickly 
reaching pandemic scale. Or as Admiral Stansfield Turner sums up, biological 
weapons (like none other than nuclear) have the capacity to bring the US past 
the “point of non-recovery.”124  
 
An alternative ethical approach to the late modern condition is characterized by 
the calculus of risk. Understanding the contemporary in terms of risk means 
acknowledging that decisions in the present shape an uncertain future with 
possible costs, though in uncertain ways. Yet this uncertain future is not wholly 
unknowable in the sense of an imminent danger. Risk “we construct between 
ourselves [while] danger is ‘out there,’” the way a map transforms land into a 
cultural and political medium.125 As Francois Ewald writes of insurance 
technologies, “for an event to be a risk, it must be possible to evaluate its 
probability.”126 Essential to the concept of risk is the moral imperative to act in 
the present to reduce risks. The future is not understood as an inevitable 
disaster that comes from somewhere ‘out there’. Rather, it is understood as 
uncertain and dangerous but ultimately our responsibility.  
 
I have argued that syndromic surveillance utilizes a statistics of risk, but unlike 
insurance technologies does not do so in order to discipline the future. In 
essence, it assumes the incomprehensibility of the future: the appearance of 
the epidemic from somewhere ‘out there.’ Rather than attempting to calculate 
the probability of a biological weapons attack, syndromic surveillance claims 
only to be able to identify (but not define) the improbable when it occurs. 
Syndromic surveillance refuses to understand the present in terms of risk-
based decision making. All action is displaced into the future where it is 
formulated in terms of response rather than risk.  
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If risks are eminently political, than syndromic surveillance is a sort of anti-
politics machine. By displacing decisions into the future, the space of politics in 
which decisions are debated is also displaced. The system is designed to 
ensure that disasters are visible when they occur so that they can be 
ameliorated: so that “absolute chaos” can be turned to “controlled disorder”. In 
other words, syndromic technology ensures what Robert Paine calls the “no-
risk thesis”: the refusal to turn a danger into a calculable risk. By defining the 
future as incalculable but controllable, syndromic observation avoids 
confronting the influence present actions may have on the future. By focusing 
on surveillance and response as the primary method of dealing with the 
bioterrorism threat, the United States displaces an understanding of how 
history has shaped the contemporary threat. At stake for the United States is a 
denial of responsibility in the production of global insecurity and therefore the 
likelihood that present actions will continue to exacerbate risky circumstances. 
Giorgio Agamben presents the political dilemma: 
 
Maybe the time has come to work towards the prevention of 
disorder and catastrophe, and not merely towards their control. 
Today, there are plans for all kinds of emergencies (ecological, 
medical, military), but there is no politics to prevent them…It is 
the task of democratic politics to prevent the development of 
conditions which lead to hatred, terror, and destruction–and not 
to reduce itself to attempts to control them once they occur.127  
 
 
The approach to emerging infectious diseases is revealing. The comparison is 
not random. Like the bioweapon, the future emergence and character of novel 
infectious diseases has been defined as highly uncertain. Proponents of 
syndromic surveillance argue that the system is technologically capable of 
detecting unexpected natural epidemics as well as deliberate ones. In short, if 
syndromic surveillance works, then an unexpected natural epidemic (like a 
bioweapons attack) becomes a controllable danger. Displaced by this logic, 
however, is the way present actions are responsible for producing infectious 
disease risks. The emergence of nearly every one of these new diseases has 
been ascribed to human actions: 
 
Responsible factors include ecological changes, such as those 
due to agricultural or economic development or to anomalies in 
the climate; human demographic changes and behavior; travel 
and commerce; technology and industry; microbial adaptation 
and change; and breakdown of public health measures.128  
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Even microbial adaptation (increased pathogenicity or drug resistance) has 
been largely fueled by human interventions such as the over-prescription of 
pharmaceuticals. And as Paul Farmer suggests, much of the contours and 
destructiveness of epidemics generally can be attributed to social 
inequality.129 Pouring funding into improved surveillance measures may be 
able to control or ameliorate an epidemic through early detection (although this, 
too, is highly speculative). However, the fundamental causes are displaced and 
the unequally distributed costs are ignored. Controlled disorder may be secure 
for those within the wealthy bastions of the world, where medical response and 
intervention is readily available. Yet as Farmer points out, while disease easily 
crosses borders, biomedical technologies and expertise are typically held up at 
customs.130  
 
The circuits of war and politics enmesh the bioweapon even more tightly than 
the emerging infection. Bioweapons would often be artificially manufactured, 
altered through gene-splicing, or dispersed through aerosols; they would 
always be deliberately released. This problematic hybrid of human intentions 
and natural properties cannot be dealt with in either exclusively scientific or 
political terms. Syndromic surveillance is built in response to the failure of both 
science and diplomacy to solve the bioterrorism problem. Yet instead of 
addressing the failing modern division of science from politics, syndromic 
surveillance displaces the problem altogether. The controlled disorder of 
syndromic observation makes no claim to a scientific cure for the bioweapon 
(such as rapid vaccine development); nor does it claim to a political cure (such 
as nonproliferation). It offers no cure at all, displacing all action to a future 
response and (all hopes to a controlled disorder.) 
 
The anthrax mailings of October 2001 offer a prime example of how response 
displaces responsibility. Leaving aside the fact that syndromic surveillance 
could not have detected such a small attack, the point is that a focus on 
emergency response displaced the historical origins of the event. Rather than 
an unknowable danger coming from ‘out there’, the roots of the anthrax attacks 
were fully internal to the United States. The attacker has yet to be identified. 
However, genetic investigations have determined that the bioweapon was the 
rare and particularly virulent Ames strain of anthrax. Military labs in the U.S. 
developed the Ames strains, either as an offensive weapon during the 1960s or 
for ostensibly defensive research after the global ban in 1972. The main 
custodian for the material is the U.S. Army lab at Fort Detrick, who had loaned 
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the material to other labs for research purposes.131 By understanding attacks 
like these exclusively in terms of disaster response, the responsibility of the 
U.S. military (and in particular its biological weapons programs) is displaced 
and forgotten. The costs are clear. Secret research on bioweapons within 
military institutions for allegedly defensive purposes continues and the 
probability of a pathological future, a future in which epidemic disorder 
becomes uncontrollable, increases. 
 
My observation of the contemporary is an attempt to situate syndromic 
surveillance within the multiple histories of health and security. In investigating 
the emergence of a technology, I too was faced with uncertainty, though of a 
slightly different mode. The object of my analysis was not at all clear. As two of 
the developers of the NYC syndromic system acknowledge, “Despite a flood of 
interest and funding, many questions remain: Just what is syndromic 
surveillance?”132  
 
My paper doesn’t necessarily answer that question, or at least, it doesn’t utilize 
such ontological terms. On the contrary, I hope to intervene in the impending 
solidification of the syndromic security apparatus by temporally jarring it with 
the genealogies of the past, intertwined and complex, that surface in the 
present. The ostensible novelty of emergent technologies is always deeply 
conditioned by the past, more an assemblage of extant tools than a sui generis 
creation. I conclude with the words of French philosopher Michel Serres. He 
writes: 
 
What things are contemporary? Consider a late-model car. It is a 
disparate aggregate of scientific and technical solutions dating 
from different periods. One can date it component by 
component: this part was invented at the turn of the century, 
another ten years ago, and Carnot’s cycle is almost two hundred 
years old. Not to mention that the wheel dates back to neolithic 
times. The ensemble is only contemporary by assemblage, by its 
design, its finish, sometimes only by the slickness of the 
advertising that surrounds it.133  
 
Anyone who claims to know the future is deluded. Yet it is our obligation to 
engage the present, as a brief moment chained to both past and future, and 
thereby take responsibility for reducing the pathologies of the future.  
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